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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 
REINFORCED CONVERGENCE PROCEDURES AND 
A NEW  EXCHANGE RATE MECHANISM 
IN  STAGE THREE OF EMU 1.  Introduction 
1.1.  The Madrid  European Council  in  December  1995  requested  that the  Ecoftn  Council, 
together  with  the  Commission  and  the  Eurc1pean  Monetary  Institute  (EMI)  in  their 
respective  fields  of competence,  study  the  range  of issues  raised  by  the  fact  that  some 
Member States may not initially participate in the Euro area.  In  particular, issues related to 
monetary  instability  were  to  be  examined.  Consideration  of the  relationships  between 
Member States  participating in  the Euro area (the "ins")  and  the non-participant Member 
States (the "pre-ins") has focused on the need for an  appropriate and voluntary exchange-
rate arrangement between the euro and the remaining national currencies. 
1.2.  The Ecofin Council first discussed the new exchange rate arrangement at its  informal 
meeting of 12/13 April,  1996 in  Verona and progress reports were provided to the Florence 
European  Council  on  21/22  June,  1996  by  the  Ecofin,  the  EM I  and  the  Commission. 
Building  upon  the  consensus  reached  in  Florence,  the  Ecofin  Council  reached  a  broad 
understanding upon the main  elements of a  new exchange rate mechanism - based on  the 
existing  exchange  rate  mechanism  (ERM)  - at  its  informal  meeting  in  Dublin  on 
20/21  September, 1996. 
1.3.  The  Commission  is  convinced of the  need  for  a  new  ERM  in  stage three  so  as  to 
provide  for  the  prospect of full  participation  in  the  euro  area  and  to  protect  the  single 
market.  The new mechanism will demonstrate monetary solidarity within the Union, while 
fostering convergence and exchange rate discipline among the "pre-ins".  In this context, the 
Commission  welcomes  the  understanding  reached  on  the  main  elements  of the  new 
mechanism, which may be summarized as follows: 
oThe new ERM will be composed of bilateral links between the curo and the "pre-in" 
currencies;  this  so-called "hub-and-spokes"  model  will  clearly  identify the euro as  the 
anchor of the mechanism and will focus on the need to achieve convergence among the 
"pre-ins" toward the high standard of macro-economic stability in the euro area. 
• Central  rates  and  fluctuation  margins  will  be  set  in  a  common  procedure  involving 
Ministers, Governors of the European  Central  Bank (ECB) and of the non-participant 
national central banks (NCBs), and the Commission; fluctuation margins will be wide, 
while not excluding closer links  between  the  euro and  "pre-in"  currencies  based on 
progress in convergence and established by the same common procedure; 
o Intervention  support,  with  appropriate  financing  facilities,  will  be  automatically 
available at the margins but the ECB or relevant NCB will  have the right to suspend 
intervention if its  overriding policy objective of price stability is jeopardized; practical 
ways to limit the fluctuation between the currencies of the "pre-ins" within the standard 
margins are also envisaged. 
• Realignments  should  be  made  in  a  timely  manner  and  by  common  procedure;  all 
parties  involved in  the  common procedure will  have the right to  trigger a  procedure 
which might result in a realignment. - 2-
2.  The role of reinforced convergence procedures in the new ERM 
2.1  The  Commission  notes  that  the  exchange-rate  stability  enjoyed  since  Spring  1995 
reflects the substantial  progress  in convergence achieved  by  all  the  Member States.  The 
success of these convergence efforts - evident both  in  terms of decelerating inflation  rates 
and  improved  budgetary  performance  - bodes  well  for  the  operation  of the  new  ERM. 
Moreover,  the  progress in  convergence already achieved confirms the Commission's view 
that  the  "pre-in"  status  of  any  Member  State  after  I January,  I  <J<J<J  will  be  merely 
transitional.  The new ERM should be viewed, therefore, as a framework to support the final 
steps in convergence among the "pre-ins" ahead of participation in  the euro area. 
2.2  Experience has shown that exchange rate stability depends more than anything else upon 
sound macroeconomic management.  The quality of macroeconomic management among 
the "pre-ins" in stage three willbe reflected in  their steady progress toward achieving a high 
degree  of sustainable  convergence.  Accordingly,  the  successful  implementation  of a 
credible  convergence  programme  would  be  expected  to  minimize  the  risk  of sustained 
weakness in the exchange rate of  a "pre-in".  With this in mind, the Commission proposes to 
reinforce existing convergence procedures for the "pre-ins". 
2.3  Given the linkage between exchange rate stability and convergence, the Commission would 
foresee a role for reinforced convergence programmes in the management of the new ERM. 
For example, the progress achieved by a  "pre-in" toward its  convergence objectives might 
be  used  as  a  reference  in  deciding on  the  sustainability  of central  rates.  A  favourable 
performance relative to convergence objectives would be expected to strengthen the case for 
support for a "pre-in" currency in  the event of speculative pressures.  However, the usc of 
convergence programmes as a reference in  the context of the new ERM would not interfere 
with  the  ECB's  prerogative  to  safeguard  its  price  stability  objective  with  respect  to  its 
intervention  obligations.  This  convergence-based  approach  to  operating  the  new  ERM 
would preserve flexibility while ensuring an  appropriate level of exchange rate discipline. 
Moreover, as  a more "preventive" than  "corrective" approach,  it also seems well-suited to 
the needs ofthc "pre-ins". 
3  Reinforced convergence procedures 
3.1.  With a view to  ensuring full  participation in  the curo area at the earliest possible date, 
convergence efforts  by  the  "pre-ins"  will  need  to  be unclcrpinnccl  in  the third  stage.  In 
particular, there is  already an understanding that the submission of convergence programmes 
for consideration  by the Council  should  become a  formal  obligation  for  the  "pre-ins"  in 
parallel  with  the  obligatory  stability  programmes  proposed  for  the  "ins".  The  Member 
States concerned would be required to submit new convergence programmes (to replace the 
existing generation) before the beginning of stage three on  1 January,  1999 with a common 
structure and information content so  as  to  ensure a  comparable standard against which to 
judge performance. 
3.2  Objectives for  the  inflation  rate,  the  government budget balance and  tlie  government 
debt  ratio  would  be  included  in  the  convergence  programmes,  together  with  a  clearly-- 3 -
specified multi-annual adjustment path towards these objectives.  Prospects for the exchange 
rate and long-term interest rates would also be considered so as to complete the coverage of 
the  convergence  criteria  in  the  Treaty.  Measures  taken  or  proposed  to  achieve  the 
convergence  objectives  would  be  described  and  accompanied  by  indications  of 
supplementary action in  the event of significant slippage.  The main economic assumptions 
underlying the convergence strategy - perhaps including some sensitivity analysis - would 
be made explicit so that the conditions in which the strategy is  likely to be implemented may 
be understood and their realism assessed. 
3.3.  The time horizon for new convergence programmes should, in  principle, be very short in 
view of the degree of convergence likely to have already been achieved by the "pre-ins" on 
1 January,  1999.  Nevertheless, a  medium-term focus  - in  particular, establishing a budget 
deficit target below 3% of GOP - would seem appropriate, facilitating the conversion of a 
convergence programme to a stability programme as soon as the relevant "pre-in" qualified 
for participation in  the euro area.  Convergence programmes would be updated each year. 
Updating of programmes would involve a review of the implementation of the programme, 
confirmation of convergence objectives and the relevant adjustment paths, and, in the event 
of observed slippage, <i  description of additional measures to be taken.  The macroeconomic 
assumptions underlying the programme would also  be reviewed,  with the implications of 
any revisions to be fully reOected in the convergence strategy. 
3 .4.  Strengthened  convergence  procedures  at  the  Community  level  arc  also  envisaged. 
Notwithstanding the primacy of national  responsibility for convergence,  the  Council  and 
Commission would exploit to the maximum the surveillance procedures provided for under 
Article 103 of the Treaty.  The Council would be required to complete an examination of a 
convergence programme within two months of its submission and would be given the right 
to  endorse  the  programme  upon  a  recommendation  from  the  Commission  and  after 
consulting  the  Monetary  Committee/Economic  and  Financial  Committee.  This  would 
indicate a  mutual commitment: a commitment from  the "pre-in" Member State to proceed 
quickly toward  the  conditions  necessary for  the  adoption of the  euro  and  a  commitment 
from the Union to support the Member State's efforts. 
3.5.  The implementation of the convergence strategy would be monitored on a regular basis 
at  the  Community  level.  Major  slippage  from  targets  would  be  identified  and  a 
recommendation  would be made that  corrective action  be taken  by the time of the  next 
update of the programme at the latest.  Moreover, the budgetary objectives laid down in the 
convergence programme would become the basis for establishing recommendations where 
these are required under the excessive deficit procedure and in assessing compliance with 
those recommendations. 
p.m.  The legal basis .for rein.forcetl conl'ergence procedure.\· 
The  legal  basis  for  strengthening  the  existing  convergence  procedures  would  derive  from 
Article  1  03(5)  which  allows  the  Council  to  "adopt  detailed  rules  for  the  multilateral 
sun•eil/ance  procedures".  As  in  the  case  of ensuring  budgetary  discipline  in  stage  three, 
secondary legislation can be adopted with a view to strengthening those aspects of multilateral 
surveillance relevant to convergence. 